Asset prices and the equity premium might re ‡ect doubts and pessimism. Introducing these features in an otherwise standard New-Keynesian model changes in a quite substantial way the nature of optimal policy. Three are the main results: i) asset-price movements improve the in ‡ation-output trade-o¤ so that average output can rise without increasing much average in ‡ation; ii) a "paternalistic" policymaker -maximizing the expected utility of the consumers under the true probability distribution-chooses a more accommodating policy towards productivity shocks than in a standard NewKeynesian model and in ‡ates the equity premium; iii) a "benevolent" policymakermaximizing the objective through which decisionmakers act in their ambiguos worldfollows a policy of price stability.
Introduction
The theme of monetary policy and asset prices has been widely debated in the literature, especially after the 2007-2009 …nancial crisis. Several authors have argued that monetary policy in the last decade was too expansionary when compared to the previous twenty years, and that a policy more aggressive toward in ‡ation would have been bene…cial to avoid the spur of the asset price bubble. 1 In this paper, we revisit the theme of monetary policy and asset prices in a standard New-Keynesian monetary model. An important shortcoming of current models is to have counterfactual implications for the equity premium and other …nancial relationships. We address this issue by introducing distortions in agents'beliefs-doubts and ambiguity aversionwhich enable the model to reproduce realistic values for the equity premium and the market price of risk. 2 We are interested in studying how the presence of doubts and ambiguity, and the consequence that premia on risky assets are signi…cant, in ‡uence the characterization of optimal monetary policy. In this environment, we distinguish between a "paternalistic"policymaker who cares about the utility of agents evaluated under the true probability distribution, and a "benevolent"policymaker who maximizes the objective through which agents handle their decisions in their ambiguous world. In presence of ambiguity, the policy conclusions change in a substantial and interesting way with respect to the standard model without ambiguity when the policymaker is "paternalistic", while they do not change for the "benevolent" policymaker.
In the benchmark model without ambiguity, discussed in the literature, the welfaremaximizing policy following a productivity shock involves keeping prices stable. Moreover, 1 See for instance the discussion of Taylor (2007) and section 5 in Greenspan (2010) . See also The Economist May 18th 2010. 2 Doubts and aversion to ambiguity are introduced using the framework of Sargent (2005, 2007) . See Barillas et al. (2009) for the ability of this framework to reproduce realistic values for the equity premium and the price of risk.
average output cannot rise because it is too costly to increase average in ‡ation. 3 In our framework, the welfare-maximizing policy of the "paternalistic"policymaker is more accommodating and involves an increase in in ‡ation following positive productivity shocks. The in ‡ation-output trade-o¤ becomes less severe, because of the interaction between asset prices and …rms'price-setting behavior. The equity premium is higher than under a price-stability policy because equity returns are more procyclical. Indeed, average output can rise without much increase in average in ‡ation if the …rms'discounted value of current and future costs does not move much. This is the case when future marginal costs are procyclical while the stochastic discount factor is countercyclical, a property which is indeed enhanced by the presence of doubts in the model. Thanks to this ‡attening of the trade-o¤ between average in ‡ation and average output, a more expansionary policy is optimal because it can correct for the ine¢ ciencies due to monopolistic competition by raising average output while keeping average in ‡ation low.
When the policymaker is instead "benevolent", two forces balance out to deliver price stability as the optimal policy. One pointing towards a more procyclical policy through the channel described above, and the other towards a countercyclical policy because of the way doubts now distort the objective of the policymaker.
We further show that an interest rate rule calibrated to match monetary policy under Greenspan's tenure as a chairman of the Federal Reserve achieves equilibrium allocations that resemble the ones prescribed by optimal policy of the "paternalistic" policymaker in our framework. In addition, we show that Greenspan's policy is closer to optimal policy in our model than the traditional Taylor rule. In fact, in our model, exploiting the less severe output-in ‡ation trade-o¤ requires a relatively more procyclical policy. However, we also …nd that the estimated Greenspan's policy is too accommodative even from the perspective of our model.
The closest paper to our work is Karantounias (2009) which analyzes a Ramsey problem but in the optimal taxation literature where, like in our model, the private sector distrusts the probability distribution of the model while the government fully trusts it. Beside the di¤erent focus of the two economic applications, the other subtle di¤erence is in the approximation method. Whereas Karantounias (2009) 4 Both issues explain why in his context, in contrast to our results, the optimal stabilization policy following productivity shocks is to keep prices stable no matter what is the degree of distrust that the agents might have. Dupor (2005) analyzes optimal monetary policy in a New-Keynesian model in which only the investment decisions are distorted by an ad hoc irrational expectactional shock. In our framework, the distortions in the beliefs are instead the result of the aversion to model mis-speci…cation on the side of households, which also a¤ects in an important way the intertemporal pricing decisions of the …rms on top of the investment decisions.
There are several other papers that have formulated optimal monetary policy in ad hoc 4 Indeed, in his framework distorted beliefs should not appear in a …rst-order approximation of the AS equation-as it is instead assumed. Moreover, beliefs will a¤ect second-order terms and therefore the construction of the micro-founded quadratic loss function unless the approximation is taken around a non-distorted steady state.
linear-quadratic framework where the other main di¤erence with respect to our work is that the monetary policymaker distrusts the true probability distribution and the private-sector expectations are aligned with that distrust. 5 We, instead, take a pure normative perspective from the point of view of a fully knowledgeable policymaker who knows the true probability distribution and understands that the private sector distrusts it.
The structure of the paper is the following. Section 2 discusses model uncertainty. Section 3 presents the model. Section 4 characterizes the optimal policy. Section 5 studies the mechanism through which doubts and ambiguity matter for policy. Section 6 compares optimal policy with interest-rate rules. Section 7 concludes.
A model of doubts and ambiguity
In this section, we describe how we introduce ambiguity and doubts in a standard NewKeynesian model. In particular we borrow the framework from the model of ambiguity developed by Hansen and Sargent (2001 , 2005 , 2007 , 2008 .
In this environment, agents are endowed with one model, called the "reference" model,
represented by a particular probability distribution. We denote with (s t ) the "reference" probability measure on histories s t . The "reference" model is given to the agent as the true probability distribution, but he/she does not trust it. He/She expresses his/her distrust by surrounding the "reference" model with a set of alternative nearby models. At the end, agents act using one of the alternative models, i.e. a nearby "subjective"distribution which is close to the "reference"probability distribution.
A generic nearby "subjective" probability distribution, called~ (s t ); is such because it is modelled to be absolutely continuous with respect to the "reference" measure. Leitemo and Soderstrom (2008) , Rudebusch (2001) . 6 Absolute continuity is obtained by using the Radon-Nykodym derivative, which converts the reference this property, the "reference" and the "subjective" measures agree on which events have zero probability. Moreover, the ratio between the two probability measures,~ (s t )= (s t ); is equivalent to another probability measure G(s t ); which indeed acts as a change of measure and is a non-negative martingale with the property
The martingale increment g(s t+1 js t ); de…ned as g(s t+1 js
represents instead the change of measure in conditional probabilities and is equivalent to the likelihood ratio~ (s t+1 js t )= (s t+1 js t ).
For each random variable X t+1 , the martingale G t and the martingale increment g t+1 de…ne the mappings between the unconditional expectations under the two measures and between their conditional expectations, respectivelỹ
where, E( ) andẼ( ), denote the expectation operators under the "reference" and "subjective" probability measures, and E t ( ) andẼ t ( ) the respective conditional-expectation operators.
In this environment, decision makers have too choose how to handle model uncertainty and need to make their consumption and leisure decisions. In particular, in the HansenSargent framework, decision makers act using one of the nearby "subjective" probability measure and use this to evaluate the expected discounted value of the utility ‡ows U (C t ; L t )
where C t is a consumption index, which will be speci…ed later, and L t is leisure. In particular, measure into the subjective one. This property prevents mistakes to be detected in …nite samples. See Hansen and Sargent (2001 , 2005 , 2007 for details.
preferences are described using the multiplier-preference approach of Hansen and Sargent (2001 , 2005 , 2007 , 2008 as
where ; with 0 < < 1, is the intertemporal discount factor. The objective (4) is composed by two terms. The …rst term represents the expected discounted value of the utility ‡ows from consumption and leisure, where expectations are indeed taken with respect to the distorted probability measure. Agents choose consumption, labor and asset allocations, which will be speci…ed later, to maximize the objective (4) under their budget constraint. The second term, instead, represents discounted entropy which measures the distance between the "reference" and the "subjective" probability distribution. Choices over the distorted beliefs,~ (s t ); described here by G t and g t ; are taken by minimizing the objective (4). How much entropy to allow with respect to the "reference"model depends among other things on the parameter , with > 0, which is indeed a penalty parameter capturing the degree of ambiguity that the agent faces. 7 Higher values of imply less fear of model mis-speci…cation, because this raises the cost of entropy in the minimization problem implying a choice for a less distorted probability distribution. When goes to in…nity the optimal level of entropy that minimizes (4) is zero. Therefore choices are made under rational expectations, since
Therefore, according to (4), agents'decision problem in this economy is, on the one side, "standard", since they will choose consumption and leisure to maximize expected discounted utility, where however expectations are taken with respect to the distorted measure. On the other side, the non-standard feature is that they will also make decisions with respect to 7 Hansen and Sargent (2001, 2005, 2007, 2008) show that the preference speci…cation given by (4) can be mapped into a di¤erent problem in which entropy is treated directly as a constraint on the set of alternative models that the agent can consider. In particular they relate the parameter to the Lagrange multiplier of the entropy constraint in this alternative environment. They also show that the two models can be aligned to imply the same equilibrium outcome.
which distorted probability measure to use. This choice corresponds to the most unfavorable one given the weight entropy has in their preferences. Hansen and Sargent (2001 , 2005 , 2007 , 2008 show that the max-min optimization of (4) can be solved in two steps. First, solve the minimization problem with respect to the choice of the beliefs, which implies a transformation of the original utility function (4) into a non-expected recursive utility function of the form
where the coe¢ cient is related to through the following equation
showing that 1: In particular, = 1 corresponds now to the rational expectations model. In (5), we have restricted the utility ‡ow to the form U (C t ; L t ) = ln C t + ln L t : 8 A further implication of the above minimization problem is that the martingale increment g t+1 at optimum can be written in terms of the non-expected recursive utility as
As a second step, using (5), …nd the optimal allocation of consumption and leisure under the standard budget constraint which will be discussed in the next section.
There are alternative interpretations of the above framework which have been given in the 
Model

Households
In this section, we present the model economy, which consists of a standard New-Keynesian closed-economy model with a continuum of …rms and households along the lines of King and Wolman (1996) and Yun (1996) where we abstract from monetary frictions. As discussed in the previous section, preferences of the representative household are non-standard and given
by (4) where the martingale increment is optimally chosen as in (6) where V t is given by (5).
In (4), C t is a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator of the continuum of consumption goods produced in the economy
where ; with > 0, is the elasticity of substitution across the consumption goods and c t (j)
is the consumption of the individual good j; L t is leisure.
Households are subject to a ‡ow budget constraint of the form
where W t denotes the nominal wage received in a common labor market; N t is labor (notice that N t + L t = 1); P k t represents the nominal rental rate of capital, K t ; which is rented in a common market to all …rms operating in the economy; x t is a vector of …nancial assets held at time t, Q t the vector of prices while D t the vector of dividends; P t is the consumption-based price index given by
where P t (j) is the price of the individual good j. Finally T t represents government's lumpsum taxes, and I t investment. Given K t and I t , next-period capital stock is given by
where ; with 0 < < 1; represents the depreciation rate and ( ) is a convex function of the investment-to-capital ratio. The convexity of the adjustment-cost function captures the idea that is less costly to change the capital stock slowly. It implies that the value of installed capital in terms of consumption varies over the business cycle, therefore the model implies a non-trivial dynamic for the Tobin's q:
Households maximize expected utility (4) by choosing the sequences of consumption, capital, leisure and portfolio holdings under the ‡ow budget constraint (7), the law of accumulation of capital (8) and an appropriate transversality condition. Standard optimality conditions imply the equalization of the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure to the real wage
The …rst-order conditions with respect to asset holdings imply the standard orthogonality condition between the stochastic discount factor and the asset returñ
where M t;t+1 is the nominal stochastic discount factor between period t and t + 1 de…ned by
and R j t+1 is the one-period nominal return on a generic asset j given by R j t+1
Moreover, by de…ning with m t;t+1 the real stochastic discount factor, as m t;t+1 = M t;t+1 P t+1 =P t , we can write the optimality condition with respect to capital as an orthogonality condition of the formẼ
where the real return on capital is de…ned by
and in particular q t denotes the model Tobin's q given by
Tobin's q measures the consumption cost of a marginal unit of capital and is increasing with the investment-to-capital ratio. The return on capital, described in (13), is given by two components: the …rst one captures the return on renting capital to …rms in the next period, while the second component captures the bene…ts of additional units of capital in building up capital stocks for the future rental markets.
Firms
There is a continuum of …rms of measure one producing the respective consumption goods using a constant-return-to-scale technology given by
for each generic …rm j where A t represents a common labor-productivity shifter and , with 0 < < 1, is the capital share. Given the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator, a generic …rm j faces the following demand
where total output, Y t , is equal to consumption and investment
Households own …rms which distribute pro…ts in the forms of dividends. Given (10), the value of a generic …rm j is given by
where nominal dividends are de…ned as
Given (17) and (18), the nominal value of a generic …rm j cum current dividend is given by
where M t;t = 1.
We assume that …rms choose prices, capital and labor to maximize the …rm's value cum current dividend. In particular, cost minimization under the production function (15) implies that total costs are linear in current output
and that the capital-to-labor ratio is equalized across …rms
Firms are subject to price rigidities as in the Calvo mechanism. In particular, at each point in time, …rms face a constant probability (1 ); with 0 < < 1; of adjusting their price which is independent of the last time the price was re-set. Firms, which can adjust their price P t (j) in period t, set it by maximizing the present-discounted value of the …rm cum current dividend considering that prices set at time t will last until a future time T with probability T t .
The optimal price decision together with the Calvo price mechanism implies the following
in which the gross in ‡ation rate is given by t = P t =P t 1 and Z t is given by the following expression
in which we have de…ned the mark-up as =(1 ): Moreover F t ; in equation (20) , is given by
Equilibrium
In equilibrium, aggregate output is used for consumption and investment as in (16) . Financial market equilibrium requires that households hold all the outstanding equity shares and that all the other assets are in zero net supply.
Capital and labor markets are also in equilibrium
In particular, equilibrium in the labor market implies
where t is a measure of price dispersion de…ned by
which follows the law of motion
Finally, lump-sum taxes are adjusted to balance revenues and costs for the government in each period.
Given the process for the stochastic disturbances fA t g, initial conditions ( t 0 1 ,
and a monetary policy rule, an equilibrium is an allocation of quantities and prices {C t , Y t , (5), (6), (8), (9), (12), (14), (16), (19) , (20), (21), (22), (23), (24) hold, considering the de…nitions of the following variables M t;t+1 , r k t , L t ; t , which are given in the text, and considering that the distorted expectation operator is related to the reference expectation operator through (3).
Optimal policy problem
In this section, we study optimal policy from a normative perspective. In our environment, the issue of which objective to maximize is subtler than under the benchmark case of no model uncertainty, extensively discussed in the literature. In the standard Ramsey approach this should coincide with the utility of the households. Things are more complicated here because, as discussed in Barillas et al (2009) , model uncertainty is just in the head of the agents: they have complete knowledge of the "reference" probability distribution, which is the "true"distribution, but simply they do not trust it. Therefore, the preferences described in (5) represent more a way to handle decisions in an ambiguous world rather than really the utility agents are getting. Indeed, at the end, states of nature will be realized through the "reference"probability distribution.
We present two alternative approaches to welfare analysis: the "benevolent"policymaker and the "paternalistic" policymaker. The "benevolent" policymaker commits to maximize the preferences through which agents make their decisions in the economy. In this case, the objective to maximize is given by (4) or, equivalently, by (5) . A "paternalistic"policymaker instead commits to maximize the present discounted value of the utility ‡ows
where expectations are taken under the "reference" probability distribution, which governs the realization of the states of nature. The objective (25) is the expected utility that agents will receive ex-ante if they were trusting the model, but also the utility in the long-run when model uncertainty is resolved. 9 It should be clear that under the "paternalistic"
policymaker there is no additional information problem, or asymmetry, nor the policymaker 9 In an optimal taxation problem, Karantounias (2009) analyzes this case as the relevant one, calling it the Ramsey policymaker. Karantounias (2011) , in the same environment, considers a policymaker who also expresses doubts on the reference probability distribution.
can reveal more to the agents than what they already know by maximizing a di¤erent objective rather than the one agents are using for their choices. Indeed, the "reference" probability distribution is part of the information that agents have: they are told that this is the "true"probability distribution-simply they do not trust it. 10 We are interested in characterizing optimal policy under commitment. The "benevolent" policymaker, in this case, seeks to maximize (4) or V t 0 in (5) by choosing the sequences fC t , (5), (6), (8), (9), (12), (14), (16), (19) , (20), (21), (22), (23), (24) given the process for the stochastic disturbance {A t g and initial conditions ( t 0 1 , K t 0 1 ), given the relationship between leisure and labor, L t = 1 N t ; considering the de…nitions of the variables m t;t+1 , r k t ; t ; and that the distorted expectation operator is related to the "reference"expectation operator through (3): Instead, the "paternalistic" policymaker commits to maximize the objective (25) under the same constraints of the "benevolent" policymaker.
Given that the two optimal policy problems are time-inconsistent because of the presence of forward-looking constraints, we add other constraints on initial values to write the problem in a recursive way, as discussed among others by Benigno and Woodford (2011) . Our solution method is to consider the set of non-linear …rst-order conditions of the two optimal policy problems under this stronger form of commitment. We proceed as follows. First, we compute the optimal policy in the non-stochastic steady state, where there is no model uncertainty.
Second, using standard perturbation techniques, we take a …rst and, when needed, a secondorder approximation, around the non-stochastic steady state, to the non-linear stochastic …rst-order conditions of the optimal policy problem (discussed above), and study the resulting equilibrium allocation.
We calibrate the structural parameters of the model consistently with existing results in 10 In Klibano¤ et al. (2009) the rational expectations objective function under the "true" probability distribution is also an interesting reference point since the utility of the agents will converge to it in the long run when the set of alternative probability distribution is …nite. the macroeconomic literature. In particular, following Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005), we set = 0:36 which corresponds to a steady-state share of capital income equal to roughly 36 percent. We set = 0:025, which implies a rate of capital depreciation equal to 10 percent at annual rates. This value of is roughly equal to the estimates reported in Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992) . In addition, we set the coe¢ cient of the demand elasticity with respect to prices, ; equal to 6; implying a steady-state price markup of 20 percent. 11 We choose = 0:45 to match a steady state Frisch elasticity of labor supply of 1. that 1= 00 = 0:25; which corresponds to the steady-state elasticity of the investment-tocapital ratio with respect to Tobin's q: We assume the following random-walk process for productivity log(A t+1 ) = + log(A t ) + " t+1 ;
where " t+1 has zero mean and standard deviation ; and is a drift in technology: We assume = 0:012 and = 0:003 to match respectively the volatility and the mean of U.S.
quarterly total factor productivity estimated by Fernald (2008) . The model is consistent with a balanced-growth path, and therefore we can obtain a stationary representation by rescaling the appropriate variables through the level of productivity: We study optimal policy for di¤erent values of the parameter 2 f1; 25; 50; 100g. In particular, = 1 represents the benchmark model of rational expectations, while = 100 is the degree of model uncertainty at which our model matches the average U.S. equity premium of 5.5% per year, as estimated by Fama and French (2002) . 12 Finally, the discount factor is set equal to = 0:99, implying 11 Similar values are obtained in Smets and Wouters (2007) . 12 The 5.5% equity premium is obtained under a Taylor rule, which requires the risk-free nominal interest rate, R f ; in log-deviations from its steady state, R f ; to evolve according to ln R
an average real interest rate of one percent at = 100. Figures 1 and 2 show the impulse responses of selected variables to a one standard deviation shock to technology under di¤erent values of the parameter for the "benevolent" policymaker, while Figures 3 and 4 show the results to the same experiment for the "paternalistic" policymaker.
Results
FIGURE 1 HERE FIGURE 2 HERE
The case = 1 corresponds to the benchmark model of rational expectations. As it is well known, price stability, and therefore replicating the ‡exible-price allocation, is the optimal policy. 13 Following a permanent productivity shock, consumption and output steadily increase towards their new higher steady-state levels. The real and nominal interest rates rise on impact and steadily decline to sustain the increase over time in consumption.
The return on capital, the Tobin's q and therefore investment increase on impact.
FIGURE 3 HERE FIGURE 4 HERE
When agents face ambiguity, the optimal policies run by a "benevolent" or a "paternalistic" policymaker are quite di¤erent. The striking result is that the equilibrium outcome implied by the "benevolent"policymaker is similar to that of the benchmark model, without ambiguity, and this is true for any degree of model uncertainty. As shown in Figures 1 and
where ln t = is the log-deviation of the in ‡ation rate from its steady state and ln Y t =Y t is the output gap 2, there are marginal deviations from a policy of price stability.
14 Instead, the policy chosen by the "paternalistic"policymaker changes quite substantially and the more the higher the degree of model uncertainty. As shown in Figures 3 and 4 , the optimal policy of the "paternalistic" policymaker becomes very accommodative. In ‡ation increases on impact and then steadily declines toward zero. This increase is higher, the higher is the degree of model uncertainty. Nominal interest rates become more volatile: …rst, they decrease and afterward they rise. In the short run, the real rate now falls; consumption and output increase on impact even to overshoot their long-run levels. The Tobin's q jumps at higher levels leading to a larger change in investment. As increases, optimal policy under the "paternalistic"
policymaker becomes more and more accommodative to the technology shock. Moreover, the higher is, the higher is the volatility of the return on equity and capital and the price of equity and capital. For instance, after a one standard deviation increase in total factor productivity, equity return and Tobin's q increase on impact by 0.72% and 0.17 %, respectively, if = 1; while they jump to 1.05% and 0.52% if = 100: At optimal policy, welfare evaluated through the objective of the "paternalistic"policymaker in (25) increases by about 5% with respect to a policy of price level stabilization if = 100:
To sum up, when policy is run by a "benevolent" policymaker there are no signi…cant deviations from a price-stability policy. Instead a "paternalistic"policymaker would choose a more pro-cyclical response of in ‡ation which "over -accommodates"the technology shock.
Such an increase in in ‡ation is accompanied by an increase in the volatility of quantity variables, such as output, investment and consumption, as well as in the volatility of asset prices, such as the Tobin's q, the equity and capital returns, the nominal and real interest rates. The larger the degree of distortion in beliefs, the larger the departure of optimal policy from price stability.
Why does model uncertainty matter for optimal policy?
The objective of this section is to explain why model uncertainty matters for optimal policy when the policymaker is "paternalistic"and why it does not matter when the policymaker is "benevolent". To this end, we need to study how model uncertainty and ambiguity interact with the other distortions present in the economy, and how the transmission of monetary policy is a¤ected by each of them. Our model features four types of distortions that affect equilibrium allocations: sticky and staggered prices, monopolistic competition, capital adjustment costs, and distorted beliefs which indeed originate from doubts and ambiguity.
We brie ‡y discuss the nature of each of the four distortions while we also show, borrowing Relative-price distortion. When the price level varies over time, a staggered priceadjustment mechanism generates price dispersion across …rms setting prices at di¤erent times and therefore an ine¢ cient allocation of resources among goods that are produced according to the same technology. This can be seen by inspecting equations (23) - (24), where the natural measure of this distortion is given by t : everything else being equal, higher in ‡ation requires more labor to produce the same amount of output. Given the way relative-price distortions a¤ect the equilibrium allocations, they can be thought of an additive productivity shock relative to the case of no distortion. To eliminate this distortion, we can set in each period a level of government spending, t ; such that
where is the level of price dispersion in the non-stochastic steady state. 15 The distortion in the accumulation of physical capital. Adjustment costs in physical capital introduce an ine¢ cient wedge between the price of investment and the price of installed capital, captured by the Tobin's q in equation (14) . If Tobin's q deviates from unity, i.e.
q t 6 = 1; the equilibrium investment, and therefore output, is ine¢ cient, and q t measures such ine¢ ciencies. In order to remove this distortion, we can think of a …scal authority subsidizing investments in physical capital with a subsidy given by t = It Kt
Beliefs'distortions. Distortions in beliefs a¤ect equilibrium allocations through forwardlooking decisions. In our model, agents make two types of forward-looking decisions: on the one side the choice on how much capital to accumulate, and on the other side the pricesetting decision. Concerning the …rst choice, everything else being equal, distorted beliefs cause an ine¢ cient accumulation of capital. In a second-order approximation, the excess return on capital with respect to the risk-free rate, adjusted by the Jensen's inequality, can be written as
where variables with hats denote deviations from the steady state. The distortions in the beliefs add an additional term to the premium on the capital return, which now depends on the covariance between the return on capital and the distortions in the beliefsĝ t+1 .
This additional term leads to an ine¢ cient accumulation of capital, under a policy of price stability. Indeed, in this case, the return on capital is positively correlated with the current and long-run level of technology and therefore negatively correlated withĝ t+1 . To see why ĝ t+1 depends negatively on the long-run level of technology, take a …rst-order approximation of equations (5) and (6) and assume that is close to unitary value, thenĝ t+1 can be approximated byĝ
Since the long-run level of leisure does not vary following a permanent productivity shock, a high level of g t+1 mainly re ‡ects bad news with respect to long-run consumption which can change because of the stochastic trend in productivity. 16 The second dimension along which distorted beliefs a¤ect the equilibrium allocation depends on the pricing decisions of …rms. To get the intuition on how this channel works, let us consider the aggregate-supply equation under the assumption that capital is …xed meaning that the cost of adjusting capital is in…nite and steady-state investment is equal to zero, i.e.
Y t = C t . Under this assumption and with log utility, F t in equation (22) is constant and given by F t = 1=(1 ); whereas Z t in equation (21) collapses to
Equation (26), together with (20) , makes clear that there exists a positive relationship between in ‡ation and the present discounted value of expected real marginal costs, evaluated under the reference probability measure. The distortion in beliefs a¤ects this relationship through the second term on the right-hand side of (26) . If the covariance between the martingale G t and marginal costs is negative (positive), for given in ‡ation, the present discounted value of expected real marginal costs, i.e. the …rst term on the right hand side of (26) , is higher (lower) than it would be without distortions in beliefs. This implies that for given in ‡ation and, therefore, for given price dispersion, average markup is lower (higher)
than it would otherwise be in absence of distortion in beliefs, if the covariance between the martingale G t and marginal costs is negative (positive).
To remove each of the two distortions originating from distorted beliefs in a separate way, we can use …scal instruments that correct for the distorted valuation of the return on capital, in one case, and of future pro…ts in the other case. In particular, the distortion in the physical capital accumulation resembles the distortion caused by a tax proportional to future total asset returns, i.e. including both capital gains and dividends: Therefore, a …scal authority could remove this distortion by committing to a state-contingent tax or subsidy,
The same tax/subsidy can be used in equation (17) to correct for distorted beliefs in the value of the …rm which a¤ects price setting decisions.
Results
In Figure 5 , we present the impulse responses of output, in ‡ation and the real interest rate following a technology shock under the two optimal policy problems of the "benevolent" policymaker (on the right column) and of the "paternalistic"policymaker (on the left column) for the various cases in which we remove each distortion in turn. In the …gure the parameter is …xed to = 100.
FIGURE 5 HERE
Starting with the "paternalistic"policymaker, we can see that once we remove either the monopolistic-competition distortion or the beliefs' distortions we obtain that the optimal policy is to stabilize in ‡ation to zero as in the case of no model uncertainty. The interaction between these two distortions explains why the "paternalistic" policymaker chooses a more procyclical response of output and in ‡ation following a productivity shock. Given the monopolistic-competition distortion, output and the average real marginal costs are too low.
The policymaker can increase the average real marginal costs, reduce the average mark-up by raising average in ‡ation. In a benchmark model with no ambiguity, this is too costly, as shown in the literature, and price stability dominates as optimal policy. In general, in New
Keynesian models, the trade-o¤ between in ‡ation and output is too steep to correct for the distortions due to monopolistic competition. Instead, under model uncertainty, the decision maker can raise real marginal costs without increasing much average in ‡ation provided real marginal costs covary negatively with G t ; and therefore with g t ; as shown in (26) . The comovement between asset prices and marginal cost reduces the severity of the in ‡ation-output trade-o¤. In fact, by making the stochastic discount factor negatively related with the future real marginal costs, the present discounted value of the …rms'real marginal costs does not rise much. Therefore …rms do not have much incentive to increase their prices on average.
When we focus on the optimal policy under the "benevolent" policymaker, we notice that the impulse responses change substantially from the full-distortion case only when we remove the distorted beliefs, while keeping (5) as the objective to be maximized. Indeed, the result that the "benevolent" policymaker aims at a policy of price stability, as in the benchmark model without ambiguity hinges on the fact that the distortions in the beliefs of the policymaker and that of the private sector are perfectly aligned. To understand this, consider that the objective function (5) of the "benevolent" policymaker can be written back as (4) , where G t follows the martingale process in which the martingale increment, g t ;
is optimally chosen and given by (5)- (6) . Under these constraints, the objective function (4) is indeed equivalent to (5). However, since the martingale increment is mainly dependent on the revisions in long-run productivity, the policymaker does not have much room to in ‡uence it and the second component of the above expression is quasi independent of policy. This means that the objective of the "benevolent"policymaker can be approximated by
Using this observation, we can further show that we can write all the optimal policy problem (objective and constraints) in terms of the distorted expectation operator. It follows that this problem will be exactly equivalent to that of the benchmark model, without ambiguity, except that the rational-expectation operator is replaced by the distorted-expectation operator. This means that distortions in beliefs would matter for optimal policy, but only through second-order e¤ects whereas, instead, a …rst-order approximation would show no role for distorted beliefs and deliver a price-stability result similar to the benchmark model without ambiguity. Indeed Figure 5 shows that when we remove the distortions coming from beliefs in both the AS equation and the Euler equation, we …nd that the "benevolent" policymaker would like to produce a countercyclical response of output and in ‡ation following the productivity shock. With this misalignment in beliefs, the policymaker can exploit the distortion in the beliefs still present in the objective function to improve welfare. Indeed, note that we can write (27) as
where a positive covariance between the martingale G t and the utility ‡ow is welfare improving. But, since the martingale increment depends negatively on the long-run shock to technology, consumption and output should fall following a positive productivity shock to produce such a positive covariance, as shown in Figure 5 . Table 1 reports the unconditional means of several variables of interest, computed through a second-order approximation, around the non-stochastic steady state, of the …rst-order conditions of the optimal policy problem. Several cases are presented for both the "paternalistic"and "benevolent"policymakers. The …rst two columns present the results of the optimal policy problems when all the distortions are included while the other columns remove each distortion in turn. With all the distortions in place, the "paternalistic" policymaker can increase consumption and investment by reducing substantially the average markup as we have already discussed. This comes through movements in asset prices which imply larger premia on the return on capital and equity which are indeed consistent with the data. 17 The interaction between the following two distortions is important for this quantitative result:
the presence of doubts and the adjustment costs on capital. Without the latter, the capital and equity premia are of smaller magnitude, while without doubts they are completely negligible, as it is the case under the standard New-Keynesian model. This shows that our framework represents an improvement upon the modelling present in the literature along the direction of matching also …nancial data. 18 This is not really a novelty for partial equilibrium analysis that have explained the equity premium through doubts, as Barillas et al . (2009) .
However, an important insight from a general equilibrium analysis is that policy matters a lot for the size of the risky-asset premia which are higher for the "paternalistic"policymaker.
TABLE 1 HERE
Furthermore, notice that, without the mark-up distortions, the optimal policy under the two cases coincide since the incentive to correct the monopolistic distortion disappears completely for the "paternalistic" policymaker. Finally, when we remove doubts from the private-sector reaction function, the "benevolent" policymaker can improve upon average investment through his/her countercyclical policy. 6 Greenspan, a "paternalistic"policymaker in our model?
In the last section, we have shown that a "paternalistic" policymaker brings the economy to depart in a signi…cant way from the optimal policy of price stability found in a standard New-Keynesian model. Instead, a more procyclical response of output and consumption is desirable with movements in asset prices which are consistent with signi…cant values for the premia on risky assets. In this section we evaluate Alan Greenspan's policy from the perspective of the policy implied by a "paternalistic" policymaker. We model Greenspan's policy through an interest rate rule for the risk-free nominal interest rate R 19 We obtain r = 0:9; = 0:99 and y = 0:75: We then solve our model under the estimated policy rule (28) at a degree of model uncertainty = 100.
FIGURE 6 HERE
In Figure 6 we plot impulse responses of selected variables under Greenspan's policy against the responses obtained under the optimal policy of both the "benevolent"and "paternalistic" policymakers in our model. As benchmark of comparison, we also plot the impulse responses under the classic Taylor Rule, i.e. the interest rate rule (28) evaluated at r = 0; = 1:5 and y = 0:5: In addition, notice that optimal policy under the "benevolent" policymaker is very close to a policy of in ‡ation targeting in our model. As Figure 6 illustrates, under Greenspan's policy, impulse responses of output, consumption, investment, Tobin's q, real risk-free rate and in ‡ation to a productivity shock are relatively close to the optimal policy of the "paternalistic"policymaker, substantially closer than the "benevolent" policymaker or the Taylor Rule. However, our exercise also suggests that Greenspan was perhaps too accommodative with respect to productivity shocks. For instance, output under
Greenspan's policy rises on impact by about 25% more than it should when compared to the optimal policy of the "paternalistic" policymaker. In contrast, output under "benevolent" policymaker or the Taylor Rule increases on impact by only about 1/3 of what it should at optimal policy for the "paternalistic"policymaker in our model.
Remember from previous discussion that strict in ‡ation targeting would roughly approximate optimal policy response to a productivity shock in absence of any model uncertainty,
i.e. = 1. Therefore, while Greenspan's policy would seem too expansionary from the perspective of a standard New-Keynesian model, it appears to be much closer to optimal policy of a "paternalistic"policymaker when evaluated from the perspective of our New-Keynesian model with model uncertainty. 20 
Conclusion
In this paper, we departed from the standard New-Keynesian monetary model by introducing doubts. In our model, households express distrust regarding the true probability distribution.
These doubts are re ‡ected in asset prices and might generate, together with ambiguity aversion, equity premia of similar size as those found in the data. This is an important feature of our framework with respect to the benchmark model which, on the contrary, is unable to match asset-price data. In this environment we study optimal policy from the perspective of two policymakers: a "benevolent" policymaker who cares about the utility through which agents act and a "paternalistic" policymaker who instead cares about the utility agents would have if they were not dubbing the model.
Results change in a substantial way with respect to the benchmark model when the policymaker is "paternalistic". A standard …nding of the literature is the optimality of a policy of price stability following productivity shocks. In our model with doubts, we …nd that a "paternalistic"policymaker should become more accommodative with respect to productivity shocks and work to increase the equity premium. The departure is larger, the higher is the degree of distrust that agents have. Instead, a "benevolent"policymaker would get close to the optimal policy of the benchmark model since in this case distorted beliefs have only second-order e¤ects. Indeed, the distorted beliefs in the objective function of the policymaker are aligned with those in the forward-looking private-sector reaction functions.
There are several limitations of our modeling strategy. First, we assume that households and …rms share the same degree of doubts. Households'doubts are re ‡ected in Arrow-Debreu prices and those are used to evaluate both asset prices and the future pro…ts of the …rms.
Results can change if within the private sector there are di¤erent degrees of doubts on the model. Second, we assume that the only disturbance a¤ecting the economy is a productivity shock. Results would not change if we were allowing for mark-up shocks modeled using a stationary process. Indeed, doubts and ambiguity aversion are re ‡ected in fears of bad news regarding long-run consumption. Transitory mark-up shocks, contrary to persistent productivity shocks, do not have much in ‡uence on long-run consumption. Third, an interesting case to analyze is one in which the policymaker distrusts the reference probability distribution with a di¤erent degree of ambiguity than the private sector. However, along these lines, the optimal policy of our "paternalistic"policymaker would be interpreted as that of a policymaker who completely trusts the model while the optimal policy of the "benevolent"
policymaker would be interpreted as that of a policymaker who has the same degree of distrust as the private sector. We leave the analysis of the intermediate cases for future work. 21 Finally, we have abstracted from credit frictions and asset-market segmentation which can be important features to add to properly model asset prices and the transmission mechanism of shocks. This is also material for future works. Here, we have kept the analysis the closest as possible to the benchmark New-Keynesian model to show how a small departure from that 21 See Karantounias (2011) for an extensive analysis applied to the optimal taxation literature.
model delivers important di¤erences in the policy conclusions and how this departure can rationalize a too accommodative monetary policy as an optimal policy following productivity shocks. 
